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The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant’s Groundwork
as Intellectual Paideia
Ian Hunter
In fact this satisﬁes a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people believe
they can see the ‘limits of human understanding’, they believe of course that they can
see beyond these.
Work in philosophy . . . is really more work on oneself.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
To approach philosophy as a way of working on the self means to begin
not with the experience it clariﬁes and the subject it discovers, but with the
acts of self-transformation it requires and the subjectivity it seeks to fashion.
Commenting on the variety of spiritual exercises to be found in the ancient
schools, Pierre Hadot remarks that:
Some, like Plutarch’s ethismoi, designed to curb curiosity, anger or
gossip, were only practices intended to ensure good moral habits. Oth-
ers, particularly the meditations of the Platonic tradition, demanded a
high degree of mental concentration. Some, like the contemplation of
nature as practiced in all philosophical schools, turned the soul toward
the cosmos, while still others—rare and exceptional—led to a transﬁg-
uration of the personality, as in the experiences of Plotinus. We also
saw that the emotional tone and notional content of these exercises
varied widely from one philosophical school to another: from the mo-
bilization of energy and consent to destiny of the Stoics, to the relaxa-
tion and detachment of the Epicureans, to the mental concentration
and renunciation of the sensible world among the Platonists.1
While successfully applied to ancient philosophy,2 this approach has not
been widely exploited in the history of philosophy more broadly. There is,
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however, at least one study of medieval metaphysics in these terms,3 and
there are some important discussions of early modern Stoicism and Epi-
cureanism.4 And a recent study of Hume shows the fruitfulness of the ap-
proach for Enlightenment philosophy.5 It is all themore surprising thenthat
there seems to have been no serious attempt to approach Kant’smoral phi-
losophy in this way.
Hadot and Foucault seem to have felt that the abstract and academic
character of modern philosophy meant that it was no longer cultivated as
a way of life—this despite Foucault’s treatment of Descartes’sMeditations
as a spiritual exercise designed to allow the mind to achieve certainty by
inducing, then overcoming, skepticism.6 The greater obstacle to approach-
ing Kant’s moral philosophy as a way of life, however, comes from the fact
that both its friends and its enemies insist on its formal (or formalistic)
character. AmericanKantians thus take it for granted thatKant’smoralphi-
losophy represents, not the cultivation of a moral life, but the formal re-
covery of the rational grounds that make life moral.7 As far as its Thomistic
and communitarian opponents are concerned, this formalism is the ruin
of Kantian ethics, uprooting its judgments from moral tradition and de-
taching them from themoral communitywhose substantivevirtuesprovide
the ground and purpose of morality.8 In either case, whether we view it as
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9. For a more detailed discussion, see my Rival Enlightenments: Civil andMetaphysical
Philosophy in EarlyModern Germany (Cambridge, 2001).
the rational foundation or as the rationalist deracination of moral life, we
are prevented from approaching Kant’s formal philosophy as itself a moral
culture of a particular kind.
In order to break out of this weary standoﬀ it is necessary to radically
reorient our approach to Kant’s moral philosophy. Wemust learn to see its
formal purity, not in terms of the pursuit of rational grounds, but as an
aspiration arising from the incitement to and cultivation of a certain kind
of moral purity. This viewpoint cannot be reached by asking the familiar
questions:What isKant’s puremoral lawandhow is it knownandvalidated?
Does Kant rely solely on the rational purity of the moral law in making
judgments, or does he also allow the feelings and inclinations to play a part?
Can morality be founded in formal insight into rational grounds or does it
require the cultivation of moral character and the acknowledgment of
moral community? Instead, if we are to acquire the level of detachment
needed to understand the manner in which Kant’s philosophy takes hold
of us, we must learn to ask a diﬀerent kind of question: What is it that ﬁrst
leads us to turn to ourselves in expectation of ﬁnding within the com-
manding presence of a pure moral law? How do we ﬁrst come to think of
ourselves as beings divided between the freedom of a pure intellect and the
desires of a sensuous nature? What must we do to ourselves—performing
what inner exercises using what intellectual instruments—to acquire the
deportment of someone who hears and obeys the commands of a higher
rational self? And what is the source of the extraordinary spiritual prestige
surrounding this deportment? In what follows I show why these questions
are worth asking by providing indicative answers to them in a brief re-
description of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.9
The Way In
Despite the remarkable lack of commentary on it, the fundamental re-
lation between formal purity and a speciﬁc culture of moral purity ﬁnds
symptomatic expression at the beginning of theGroundwork in the preface.
Paradoxically, this occurs in the very formulation where Kant seeks to free
a pure moral philosophy—the metaphysics of morals—from all depen-
dency on man’s empirical moral nature and its discipline, moral anthro-
pology:
Since my aim here is directed properly to moral philosophy, I limit the
question proposed only to this: is it not thought to be of the utmost
necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely
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10. Immanuel Kant,Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, inKants Gesammelte Schriften, ed.
Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences, 29 vols. to date (Berlin, 1900– ), 4:389,
hereafter abbreviatedAK; trans.Mary J. Gregor, under the title Practical Philosophy (Cambridge,
1996), pp. 44–45, hereafter abbreviated PP. I have adjusted the Cambridge translationswherever
necessary.
11. For discussions of Kant’s “pragmatic” anthropology—that is, for discussions that ignore the
role of his metaphysical anthropology in shaping the moral law itself—seeWood, “Unsociable
cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to
anthropology? For, that there must be such a philosophy is clear of it-
self from the common idea of duty and of moral laws. Everyone must
grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of an obli-
gation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the
command “thou shalt not lie” does not hold only for human beings
[Menschen], as if other rational beings [vernu¨nftige Wesen] did not
have to heed it, and similarly with all other genuine moral laws; that,
therefore, the ground of obligation must not be sought in the nature
of the human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he
is placed, but solely a priori in concepts of pure reason.10
Quite unexpectedly—given the standard readings—Kant motivates the
need for a formal and universal moral philosophy via the idea that the uni-
verse of rational beings outstrips the world of humans. Thismeans (“there-
fore”) that the grounds of moral obligationmust be sought, not in amerely
human nature, but in the formal or a priori concepts of pure reason suited
to (transhuman) “beings of reason.”
Despite Kant’s attempt to distinguish “pure moral philosophy” from all
moral anthropology—that is, from the repository of human ﬁgurations
(Stoic, Platonic, Epicurean, Christological) used to conﬁgure personhood—
it seems clear that this distinction is itself dependent on one such anthro-
pology. We can discern this anthropology in the ﬁguration of humans as a
particular species of rational being (Vernu¨nftwesen). This species is charac-
terized by the union of a rational (vernu¨nftige) nature—shared with God
and the angels—with a sensible (sinnliches) nature, consisting ofman’s sen-
sory faculties and sensuous inclinations. It is just this Christian-Platonic
ﬁguration of man as a rational being mired in the spatiotemporal world by
his senses, and in the prudential world by his sensuous inclinations, that
allows Kant to separate the metaphysics of morals from “empirical” an-
thropology. By tacitly invoking this metaphysical anthropology Kant can
identify metaphysics with pure (nonspatiotemporal) insight into a moral
law binding on a universe of pure intelligences only some of whom are hu-
man. This allows him to relegate all other anthropology to the “pragmatic”
task of reﬁning man’s sensuous inclinations to render them capable of re-
ceiving the pure moral law in the impure empirical world.11
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Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics,” Philosophical Topics 19 (Spring 1991):
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Morality, Anthropology, and Reﬂective Judgment (Chicago, 1999).
Arrived at in this manner, the metaphysical pursuit of formal founda-
tions for morality itself takes on a profoundly moral character. For it holds
the key to man’s participation in the world of rational beings to which he
is drawn by the higher (intellectual) part of his own double nature. Con-
versely, in this setting, empirical moral anthropologies—that is, all the an-
thropologies Kant construes as dealingwithmerely humannature—arenot
just philosophical mistakes. Rather, they are seen as morally corrupting,
miring rational beings in their human or sensuous natures, and thereby
hindering their metaphysical reﬁnement:
A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not
merely in order to investigate, from speculative motives, the source of
the practical principles that lie a priori in our reason, but also because
morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as
we lack the guiding thread and highest norm for their correct judg-
ment. . . . Now the moral law in its purity and genuineness . . . is to be
sought nowhere else than in a pure philosophy; hence, this (metaphys-
ics) must come ﬁrst, and without it there can be no moral philosophy
at all. That which mixes up these pure principles with empirical ones
does not even deserve the name of philosophy . . . much less does it
deserve the name of a moral philosophy, since by this very confusion it
actually damages the purity of morals themselves and acts against its
own end. [AK, 4:389–90; PP, pp. 45–46]
Kant’s opening separation of the metaphysics of morals frommoral an-
thropology is thus something far more consequential than themeta-ethical
distinction between an objective and a subjective, or a pure and applied,
ethics. In positing it as the only discipline capable of perfectingman’s high-
est or noblest part—the pure intelligence that he shares with other beings
of reason—Kant is not introducing metaphysics as a defeasible theory of
the moral subject. Rather he is presenting it to his students and readers as
the only discipline capable of purifying their sensuous natures and per-
mitting their participation in theworldofpure, self-governingintelligences.
In other words, Kant is presenting metaphysics itself as the discipline of a
prestigious way of thought and life. If this is so, then the metaphysics of
morals will turn out to be grounded in the morals of metaphysics.
If Kant opens the Groundwork by embedding the formal or pure phi-
losophy of morality in the desire for (metaphysical) moral purity, that is
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13. Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” p. 498.
14. ChristineM. Korsgaard,Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, 1996), p. 30; hereafter
abbreviatedC.
15. Wood,Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge, 1999), p. 8; hereafter abbreviatedKET.
because his ﬁguration of man as “sensibly aﬀected rational being” was the
latest incarnation of a specialmoral anthropology—thatofuniversitymeta-
physics—whose function is to incite this desire.Deeply rooted in thehistory
of Christian Platonism, the ﬁguration of man as a pure intellect mired in a
sensuous naturewas installed in themedieval universitybyAlbert theGreat,
elaborated by his student Thomas Aquinas, and transmitted to the mod-
ern philosophy faculty via the line running from Leibniz throughWolﬀ to
Kant.12 Given the centrality of metaphysical anthropology to Kant’s entire
undertaking, we may ask why its role as the enabling condition of a meta-
physics of morals has attracted so little commentary. The answer, we may
conjecture, is that most Kant commentary is written by those who have
entered philosophy through the ﬁgure of homo duplex transmitted in uni-
versity metaphysics, that is, by those who have learned to feel that Kant’s
metaphysics of morals provides the only path to moral purity, against the
odds of their own sensuous natures. John Rawls, for example, assumes that
Kant’s moral law applies to “the normal conditions of human life,” which
he then speciﬁes in terms of us being “reasonable and rational persons en-
dowed with conscience and moral sensibility, and aﬀected by, but not de-
termined by, our natural desires and inclinations.”13 In formulating the
tasks and limits of moral philosophy, Christine Koorsgaard also takes the
metaphysical anthropology for granted: “The moral law commands you to
seek your own moral perfection: the holiness of your will. This cannot be
achieved in the course of your life, for no one with a sensuous as well as a
rational nature has a morally perfect disposition.”14 For his part, Allen
Wood claims that Kant’s version of homo duplex amounts to a “contro-
versial empirical thesis about human nature,” but then he proceeds to use
the tension between man’s pure rational nature and impure empirical in-
clinations as the framework for his own discussion of the thesis.15
The ﬁgure of two-natured man, however, is neither a formal postulate
nor an empirical hypothesis, but something else altogether: the cultural de-
vice through which those being initiated into a particular moral “school”
are induced to take up a certain relation to themselves as the condition of
commencing a work on the self. Wood comes close to realizing this in his
comment that “Kant’s moral principles and his theory of human nature are
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16. See, for example, Samuel Pufendorf,On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural
Law, trans.Michael Silverthorne, ed. James Tully (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 33–38, 132–34.
designed only to add to our discontent with ourselves. . . . Kant thinks that
as rational creatures our condition must be one of dissatisfaction, self-
alienation, and endless striving” (KET, p. 334). Yet he squanders this insight
by treating the self-discontent that Kant’s anthropology is designed to incite
as if it were justiﬁed by the actual moral nature—torn between puremoral
reason and wayward sensuous inclinations—that Wood is convinced we
have. As Hadot’s comments suggest, however, wemay be discontentedwith
ourselves in several diﬀerent ways, depending on what dimension of our
lives a particular moral anthropology raises to the threshold of moral con-
cern and conﬁgures for moral transformation. We grasp the plurality of
paths tomoral subjecthood, and the rivalry between them, by recalling that
the early modern “civil” philosophers—Hobbes, Pufendorf, Thomasius—
self-consciously rejected the metaphysical anthropology of homo duplex.
Regarding the deportment it formed as hostage to both inner illuminism
and clerical supremacism, they adopted in its place a quasi-Epicurean an-
thropology of man as a dangerous creature of his passions, treating this as
the only one suited to an ethics of civil decorum backed by political con-
straint.16
Without realizing it, by identifying the metaphysical anthropology of
homo duplex with the moral subject as such, modern Kantians betray their
prior induction into a speciﬁc practice of self-cultivation and their parti-
sanship for a historically contested moral culture. Once this identiﬁcation
has been accepted, it becomes impossible to investigate Kant’s moral phi-
losophy as a particular kind ofmoral culture or way of life, for now one sees
oneself as a “sensibly aﬀected rational being” and begins to conduct one’s
life in the manner of a Kantian, that is, to aspire to a certain kind of intel-
lectual purity through the purifying eﬀects of Kantian philosophy itself.
Through our preliminary account of the dependency of “pure moral phi-
losophy” on the culture of moral puriﬁcation transmitted by university
metaphysics, we have opened up a diﬀerent way of understanding Kant’s
moral philosophy in the Groundwork.We shall approach the Groundwork,
not as a theory of the moral subject, but as a repository of devices for in-
ducting students into the cultivation of a prestigious moral self.
Section 1: Inducing the Desire for Philosophy
In purporting to show that the “supreme moral principle” is already
present in “popular moral consciousness”—and hence may be recovered
through philosophical analysis—section 1 of the Groundwork takes the
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17. SeeC, pp. 55–67; Karl Ameriks, “Kant on the GoodWill,” inGrundlegung zur Metaphysik
der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar, ed. OtfriedHo¨ﬀe (Frankfurt amMain, 1989), pp. 45–65;
andKET, pp. 17–49. Although, noteWood’s acknowledgment that “some of these claims clearly go
well beyond anything Kant can pretend to draw solely from common rationalmoral cognition.
They involve Kant’s theory of human nature” (KET, p. 25).
reader through a series of related arguments. First,Kant claims thathis read-
ers already know that the only unconditionally good thing is a good will.
They know that the good will is an incomparably higher good than all the
ends we associate with happiness—“Power, riches, honor, even health”—
and all the virtues to which the pagan philosophers aspired: “Moderation
in aﬀects and passions, self-control, and tranquil reﬂection” (AK, 4:393, 394;
PP, pp. 49, 50). Next, Kant moves to elucidate this still somewhat esoteric
conception of the good will by showing that it is already contained in the
popular idea of doing one’s duty for its own sake (see AK, 4:397–400; PP,
pp. 52–55). He then argues that his concept of duty must be understood as
the determination of thewill through themere idea or thought (Vorstellung)
of duty (see AK, 4:401–2; PP, pp. 56–57). Finally, Kant concludes that in
constructing this conception of the moral principle he has done nothing
more than clarify a principle already present in ordinary moral conscious-
ness (see AK, 4:403–5; PP, pp. 58–60).
To the extent that it is provided by scholars who have enteredmoral phi-
losophy through the Kantian anthropology,modern commentarygenerally
takes Kant at his word, treating the arguments of section 1 as an analytical
attempt to uncover the conceptions of the good and of moral obligation
already contained in “ordinary moral consciousness.”17 On the face of it
this is an extraordinary way of proceeding, in part because it seems to hinge
on getting the bearers of this consciousness (Kant’s students and readers)
to declare its contents and in part because what they are supposed to aﬃrm
is itself so extraordinary: not, as one might expect, such goods as health,
wealth, or power, and not such virtues as fortitude, compassion, or inner
tranquility, but the goodness of a will whose purity consists in being aimed
at none of these things. This way of proceeding becomes far less extraor-
dinary, however, as soon as we recall the metaphysical anthropology that
frames it. After all, it is just through this anthropology that Kant’s students
and readers come to think of themselves as beings whose ordinary self—
the one that pursues the merely material goods of health, wealth, compas-
sion, tranquillity—obscures a latent higher self whose goodness consists
solely in the purity of its willing. Students and readers who have been ini-
tiated into this way of relating to themselves will not only declare that their
consciousness harbors such a higher concept of morality, but they also will
treat this declaration as part of the culture of self-puriﬁcation through
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18. See Thomassen,Metaphysik als Lebensform, pp. 115–31.
which they seek to groom themselves in the image of this concept. Seen in
this light, the arguments of section 1 reveal a character quite unlike the an-
alytical recovery of concepts already given in experience.
Kant’s opening appeal to the reader’s “existing” knowledge that the only
unconditional good is a good will gains its force, not from conceptual anal-
ysis but from a quite diﬀerent source: an evocative pedagogicalpresentation
of the superiority of the contemplative over the prudential way of life. In
declaring that the ends of civil happiness and the virtues of self-control are
not the highest good, Kant grounds his aﬃrmations, not in any argument
against these rival ethical doctrines—doctrines in fact espousedby theEarly
Modern civil philosophers—but in the spiritual prestige already attaching
to the ideal of contemplative autarky or intellectual autonomy.18 Kant’s
“anticonsequentialism” thus ﬂows directly from the metaphysical anthro-
pology, which posits rational being’s capacity to will independently of all
external sensible goods or ends, purely to realize its own rational nature,
thereby making the rational will “good in itself ”: “A good will is not good
because of what it eﬀects or accomplishes, because of its aptness for attain-
ing some proposed end, but simply through its willing; that is, it is good in
itself and, beheld for itself, is of incomparably greater worth than anything
it could bring about merely in favor of some inclination or, if you like, the
sum of all inclinations” (AK, 4:394; PP, p. 50).
In this setting, the inferiority of empirical prudential ethics appears to
arise from its pursuit of happiness in the “external” goods found in the
world of space, time, and utility—goods lacking unity because of thevariety
of man’s sensuous inclinations and lacking certainty because of their need
for actualization outside the self. The superiority of the goodwill, however,
arises from the fact that, “beheld for itself,” it is freed from all empirical
outcomes, thereby obtaining the autarky that in fact constitutes goodness
for the contemplative ethos: “Even if . . . this will should wholly lack the
power to carry out its intentions—if with its greatest eﬀorts it should yet
achieve nothing and only the good will were left—then it would still shine
like a jewel for its own sake, as something containing its entire worth in
itself ” (AK, 4:394; PP, p. 50). In evoking the ﬁgure of the autarkic rational
will, therefore, Kant is not reminding his readers of something of which
they are already obscurely aware. Rather, he is oﬀering them an image of
the exalted personage they might become if only they will turn away from
external prudential concerns with “power, riches, honor, even health” and
begin the speculative puriﬁcation of their inner wills. He is oﬀering them a
spiritual inducement to relate to theirmoral self in a newway, to reorganize
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Foucault,The Use of Pleasure, p. 27.
their moral life around the inklings of a moral will of which they were
scarcely aware but on whose purity their moral future now hangs.
In this light, Kant’s appeal to his students’ sense of “duty for its own
sake”—formed no doubt in religious,military, andpedagogical institutions
requiring unconditional obedience—is no simple elicitationof evidence for
the moral law’s preexistence. In fact it is a means by which his students can
be induced to subject themselves to the law as something that already com-
mands them from within. The crucial thing to note in this regard is Kant’s
initial characterization of duty: “We shall therefore take up the concept of
duty, which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective
limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and
making it unrecognisable, rather bring it out by contrast andmake it shine
more brightly” (AK, 4:397; PP, p. 52). Here Kant provides his students with
a new way of relating to their (still unfocused) sense of duty. By treating its
compulsive character as arising from the form in which a pure rational will
encounters the “subjective limitations and hindrances” of their sensuous
natures, Kant incites his students to view their ordinary sense of duty (no
matter what its source) as if it were their dimly “sensed dependency” as
material beings on the self-governing community of intelligences in which
they participate as immaterial (rational) beings.
Kant’s initial formulation of the unconditional or categorical character
of the moral law—“so [setting aside inclinations] there is nothing left to
determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect
for this practical law” (AK, 4:400; PP, pp. 55–56)—cannot therefore be un-
derstood as an analysis of universalmoral obligation. For it is only after they
have learned to think of themselves as sensuously encumbered pure intel-
ligences that Kant’s students will view their sense of duty in the required
way—as the subjective surfacing of a pure inner law—rather than (for ex-
ample) as the outcome of imposed civil obligations. Rather than analyzing
a moral obligation to which all individuals are subject, Kant’s appeal to the
sense of duty for its own sake is thus a means of subjecting certain individ-
uals to the mode of obligation peculiar to university metaphysics as a par-
ticular moral culture or paideia.19 It is themeans by which Kant induces his
readers and students to relate to their moral sense, not as something that
might be satisﬁed through the attainment of worldly ends—personal tran-
quillity, civil peace—but as the obscurely immediate command of a higher
intelligence within them. It was just this mode of acceding to moral duty
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that the civil philosophers feared would result in the subordination of ex-
ternal civil duties to those known through inner illumination.
We are now in a position to elucidate the true signiﬁcance of Kant’s tri-
umphant conclusion to section 1 of the Groundwork: “Thus, through the
moral knowledge of commonhuman reason,wehave arrivedat itsprinciple
which, admittedly, it does not thus think abstractly in a universal form, but
which it does have always before its eyes and uses as a norm of judgment”
(AK, 4:403; PP, p. 58). According to Kant, this ﬁrst step into themetaphysics
of morals—the step from ordinary to philosophical consciousness—ismo-
tivated, not by moral pedagogy, but by a “natural dialectic” inherent in
man’s moral being:
The human being feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the
commands of duty presented to him by reason as so worthy of es-
teem—the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire sat-
isfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. . . . [And]
from this arises a natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to rationalize
against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt on their validity. . . .
In this way the common human reason is impelled, not by some need
of speculation (which never touches it so long as it is content to be
mere sound reason) but on practical grounds themselves, to leave its
own sphere and take a step into the ﬁeld of practical philosophy. [AK,
4:405; PP, pp. 59–60]
Here of course we recognize, not a natural dialectic, but the discontentwith
man’s sensuous nature—that is, with all of the goods lumped under this
pejorative—that has been incited through the inculcation of Kant’s meta-
physical anthropology. The desire for a philosophical clariﬁcation of “or-
dinary” (prudential, eudaemonistic) morality is not something that simply
occurs to “common human reason” but is something induced in those un-
dergoing a certain form of self-problematization. Only those who learn to
relate to themselves as beings whose pure intelligizing is threatened by their
sensible inclinations come to think of themselves as beings in need of phil-
osophical clariﬁcation in order to achieve moral perfection.
The sectarianism of Kant’s philosophy arises directly from this way of
eliciting the desire for it. By requiring his students to recognize their per-
sonal moral impurity such that it can only be rectiﬁed through the puriﬁ-
cation brought by his metaphysics of morals, Kant is demanding exclusive
adherence to his doctrines and school. Not the least disturbing aspect of
modern Kantianism is the degree to which it follows the master’s example
in this regard. Christine Korsgaard, for example, also insists that Kantian
philosophy is the natural outcome of human reason: “Philosophy is ordi-
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nary human reasoning rendered persistent. . . . Kant’s view, as I understand
it, is that a person who starts out reasoning in some perfectly ordinaryway
. . . ﬁnds himself on a route that has no natural stopping place short of the
unconditioned Ideas of Reason and the metaphysical perplexities to which
they sometimes lead.”20Korsgaard’s identiﬁcationofKant’sphilosophywith
universal reason thus leads her to treat assent to the Kantian ethic as the
only path open to a rational person: “I am saying that if you are a truly
rational agent, youmust accept Kantianmorality.”21Aphilosophical school
that embeds its teachings so deeply in its students’ sense of self—grounding
its doctrines in their induced longing for a higher true morality—will be
constitutionally predisposed to intellectual and moral sectarianism.
Section 2: Teaching Transcendence
Having secured an audience disposed to view itself as the bearer of a pure
but latent moral law, in section 2 of the Groundwork Kant shows how this
law may be revealed, requiring his students to rise from “popular moral
philosophy to the metaphysics of morals.” This transition takes the formof
a series of arguments designed to “deduce” the moral law and to show the
necessity of metaphysics for obtaining this insight. Commentary on section
2, however, too often overlooks the fact that these arguments are condi-
tioned by Kant’s powerful reinvocation of the culture of metaphysics in
which the formal purity of principles is embedded in spiritual purity of the
(transhuman) being who beholds them:
All moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in
reason. . . . They cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and there-
fore merely contingent, knowledge. In this purity of their origin is to
be found their very worthiness to serve as supreme practical princi-
ples. . . . We ought never, as is permitted and even occasionally neces-
sary in speculative philosophy, make the principles depend upon the
particular nature of human reason. Since moral laws should hold for
all rational beings [vernu¨nftige Wesen] as such, we should instead de-
rive them from the general concept of a rational being as such. In this
way, we should ﬁrst completely expound morality as pure philosophy,
that is, as metaphysics, independent of the anthropology required for
its application to man—as can be readily done in this wholly abstract
[abgesonderter] type of knowledge. [AK, 4:411–12; PP, pp. 65–66]
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As before, through its grounding in the anthropology (and cosmology)
of rational being, Kant’s argument for the theoretical need for a pure phi-
losophy (metaphysics) relies on the existential need formoral purity incited
by the metaphysical paideia. Those who attempt to derive moral concepts
fromman’s empirical nature are therefore not just philosophicallymistaken
but morally lax; moral purity can only be achieved through the exercise of
metaphysical abstraction itself. Conversely, Kant regards the cultivation of
this “wholly abstract type of knowledge” as something far more sublime
than the adoption of a correct philosophical method, for the method of
metaphysics itself holds the key to the puriﬁcation of human souls:
We know well that without possessing such a metaphysics it is vain—I
will not say to arrive at a speculative judgment of the moral element of
duty in everything dutiful—but that it is impossible, even in ordinary
and practical usage, particularly that of moral instruction, to ground
morals on their genuine principles and thereby to create pure moral
dispositions [Gesinnungen], grafting them onto human souls [Ge-
mu¨thern] for the highest good of the world. [AK, 4:412; PP, pp. 65–66]
Framed in this manner, Kant’s arguments for linking the possibility of a
puremoral law to the necessity ofmetaphysics take on a powerfully ascetic
or self-transformative character, functioning as ameans for grooming the
“pure moral dispositions” valorized by the culture of university meta-
physics.
Kant, however, presents these arguments as if they were solving a phil-
osophical problem, namely, the problem of showing how a categorical im-
perative is possible. We can show the possibility of technical imperatives
(“imperatives of skill”)—the rules of geometry, for example—by demon-
strating their analytic necessity for achieving aparticular technical end,such
as the construction of a mathematical ﬁgure (AK, 4:417; PP, p. 70). Further,
we can show the possibility of prudential imperatives as the empiricallynec-
essary means to certain kinds of happiness; although here human disagree-
ment over the ends of empirical happiness, and the uncertainty of their
worldly attainment, means that prudential imperatives lack the uniﬁed and
unconditional character of the moral law (see AK, 4:418–19; PP, pp. 70–71).
How though, asks Kant, can we show the possibility of the moral law’s cat-
egorical imperative, given that this is by deﬁnition unconditional, hence
independent of all empirical ends or goods capable of showing its necessity
as a means?
This is the problem,Kant argues, whose solutionhinges on the transition
to metaphysics, which enables the philosopher to transcend the world of
empirical ends andmeans and to propose a “solely a priori” solution.Given
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his conception of metaphysics, as the discipline permitting access to a do-
main where thinking natures act independently of all external empirical
ends, Kant’s solution is to propose that the mere thought or concept of the
categorical command might itself reveal its propositional content—and to
this degree its possibility—independent of all need to relate this command
to some empirical object or end: “In this task we want ﬁrst to inquire
whether the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provide
its formula, containing the only proposition that can be a categorical im-
perative” (AK, 4:420; PP, pp. 72–73). The only proposition that can be a
categorical imperative is, of course, “act only in accordancewith thatmaxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal
law”—because a universal law is the only one capable of commanding the
will through the mere thinking of its idea, independent of all sensible ends
and desires.
In the light of our preceding commentary, it should already be clear
that this chain of arguments is very far from what Kant claims it to be,
namely, the elucidation of a moral principle already present in human
moral consciousness. In grounding the categorical imperative’s theoreti-
cal necessity in an (induced) existential desire to behold its pure form,
Kant’s metaphysical anthropology imbues his deduction with a distinc-
tively self-transformative character and function. In this setting, the
reader’s readiness to assent to Kant’s deduction of the categorical impera-
tive—his preparedness to accept a formulation solely on this basis of its
having been thought—is driven by the induced longing to join the pure
intelligences who know and act through sheer intellection. Approaching
Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative in this way—treating it as a
spiritual exercise promising access to a transcendent reality—provides a re-
vealing insight into a procedure that many commentators have found dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile with standard forms of deduction.22
We have already noted that Kant takes the crucial step towards showing
the possibility of the categorical imperative and, with it, the necessity for
metaphysics by speculating that through the mere a priori (metaphysical)
thinking of its idea or form, independent of all empirical ends and expe-
riences, it might be possible to have insight into its propositional content.
This content is in fact the necessity that all subjective ends or wills be con-
formed to a universal law or general will.What demands our attentionnow
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is the suddenness and speed with which Kant converts this speculation into
a self-demonstrative truth:
When I think of a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know in
advance what it will contain, until I am given its condition. But when I
think of a categorical imperative I immediately know what it contains.
For, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity
that a maxim conform to the law, while the law contains no condition
to limit it, there is nothing remaining to which the maxim should con-
form except the universality of a law as such; and it is this conformity
alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary.
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this:
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law. [AK, 4:420–21;
PP, p. 73]
In ruling out the possibility of a discursive deduction of the moral law
from empirical ends, Kant is simultaneously opening up the possibility of
a nondiscursive intellectual intuition of the law. The notion of this intuition
only makes sense inside the anthropology and cosmology of university
metaphysics. The background idea is that concepts issuing directly fromthe
divine intelligence, prior to their embodiment in spatiotemporal things, are
self-declarative for a human intelligence whose purity permits it to par-
ticipate in divine intellection.23 To the extent that it abstracts from thema-
terial things and ends through which pure concepts are diﬀracted and
thereby rises to meet these concepts as they stream from the divine mind,
such an intelligence knows their meaning and truth through immediate in-
sight. It does not have to analyze this discursively from the scatter of ap-
pearances in space and time. The intuitional form inwhichKant reveals the
categorical imperative—“when I think of a categorical imperative I im-
mediately know what it contains”—may thus be regarded as his perfor-
mative personiﬁcation of this puriﬁed intelligence, allowing him to claim
insight into a principle lying beyond “the particular nature of human rea-
son.” In short, Kant’s way of demonstrating the possibility of themoral law,
through the sheer thinking of its concept, should be seen as the exemplary
pedagogical performance of an exercise in self-transcendence. It is the spir-
itual charisma attaching to this exercise—the implicit claim to transcendent
participation in the pure intelligizing of the moral law prior to its embod-
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iment in the world of space, time, and utility—that validates the otherwise
extraordinary claim that the possibility of the categorical imperative may
be shown through the mere thinking of it.
In the more reﬂective treatment of this theme in theCritique of Practical
Reason, Kant declares that our incapacity to provide a discursive deduction
of the moral principle is the ﬂipside of our extraordinary capacity to ap-
prehend it as a “fact of reason”:
The moral law is given in the manner of a fact of pure reason of which
we have a priori awareness and which is apodictically certain, even if it
is granted that we can ﬁnd no example in experience that follows it ex-
actly. Hence [even though] the objective reality of the moral law can
be proved through no deduction, or by any eﬀorts of theoretical rea-
son, whether speculative or empirically supported . . . it is nonetheless
ﬁrmly grounded in itself [steht fu¨r sich selbst fest]. [AK, 5:47; PP,
pp. 177–78]
It is surely remarkable that modern Kantians, purporting to oﬀer a rational
reconstruction of Kant’s insight, simply repeat his claim to behold a self-
grounding, self-declarative object of intellectual intuition. Rawls, for ex-
ample, after asking whether the procedure for reaching the categorical
imperative is constructed, answers: “No, it is not. Rather, it is simply laid
out.”24 Even more dramatically, Dieter Henrich argues that rather than be-
ing reached via empirical or logical ratiocination, the moral principle be-
longs to a “structure of recognition” in which it outstrips all our attempts
to justify it, appearing in the form of a demand for “approval” so emphatic
that someone who asks for a justiﬁcation of the principle before approving
“has already lost sight of it.”25
This way of regarding the moral principle, as something revealed in and
to a higher self, only makes sense once we have understood Kant’s dem-
onstration of the categorical imperative as an exercise in self-transcendence.
For this demonstration is indeed a version of the long-standing Christian-
Platonic spiritual exercisewhereby, abstracting frommerely spatiotemporal
knowledge, the metaphysician activates the higher intellect he shares with
God, thereby participating in the self-authenticating principles of an in-
tellect that creates what it thinks. Doubtless it will seem odd to many that
the voice of Kantian reason should sound so similar to the voice of God.
But this will seem the less so the more we understand that the exercise
through which Kant listens to reason is in fact a version of that through
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which Christian-Platonists attuned themselves to the emanations of the
divine intellect. Despite the layers of discursive argument wrapped around
it—necessary insulation against centuries of Lutheran suspicion of self-
sacralizing Platonism—the deduction of the categorical imperative in
Groundwork 2 remains recognizably one of Hadot’s “acts of mental con-
centration and renunciation” leading to “transﬁguration of the person-
ality.” Rather than being recovered from ordinary moral consciousness,
the categorical imperative—together with the associated principles of au-
tonomy (the autarky of the pure intellect), humanity (“rational being as
an end in itself ”), and the “kingdom of ends” (communion in the spiritus
mundi)—must be regarded as the goals of an exercise in self-transformation
promising access to a spiritual elite.
Section 3: Faith in Metaphysics
Having led his students from their ordinary moral consciousness to
moral philosophy and from thence to the metaphysics ofmorals, in section
3 of theGroundworkKant seeks to guide their ﬁnal step: “frommetaphysics
ofmorals to the critique of pure practical reason,” as the section’s title reads.
For Kant, critique means stepping beyond his primary method—the dem-
onstration of metaphysical principles through the immanent clariﬁcation
ofmoral consciousness—inorder to obtain aﬁnal reﬂectiononthegrounds
permitting such a demonstration. For us, having redescribed this demon-
stration in terms of the pedagogy of Schulmetaphysik and the exemplary
exercise in self-transcendence, critique will emerge as the ﬁnal exercise in
self-transformation through which students are inducted into the morals
of metaphysics.
As in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s procedure involves locating an
antinomy or aporia inside reason itself and then showing that this problem
can only be resolved by adopting the standpoint of critique. Reﬂectingback
on the prior two stages of the Groundwork, Kant thus observes that he has
provided a grounding for the moral law by invoking the idea of freedom as
rational autonomy. Yet this grounding, he now declares, does not appear to
show why anyone should take an interest in the moral law or subject them-
selves to it (see AK, 4:446–49; PP, pp. 94–97). Kant now argues that this
problemarises from the apparent circularity of the relationbetweenthe idea
of freedom and that of the moral law: “We take ourselves as free in the
order of eﬃcient causes in order to think ourselves undermoral laws in the
order of ends; and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to these laws
because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of the will” (AK, 4:450; PP,
p. 97). As a result:
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If someone asked us why the universal validity of our maxim as a law
must be the limiting condition of our actions, and on what we base
the worth we assign to this way of acting—a worth so great that there
can be no higher interest anywhere—and asked us how it happens that
a human being believes that only through this does he feel his personal
worth, in comparison with which that of an agreeable or disagreeable
condition is to be held as nothing, we could give him no answer. [AK,
4:449–50; PP, p. 97]
It will come as no surprise to learn that Kant’s way out of this carefully
constructed problem lies nowhere else than in the metaphysical anthro-
pology, which he is now prepared to call on explicitly. Man, says Kant, be-
longs to the sensible world to which he is attached by his passive sensibility
and in which he knows himself and his actions only as phenomenal ap-
pearances given to the understanding. At the same time, however, he also
belongs to the intelligible or noumenal world in which he participates
through the spontaneous activity of his rational nature, which hemust sup-
pose is the transcendental ego underlying his empirical subjectivity. It is
through this image of homo duplex as the nexus of the intelligible and sen-
sible worlds that Kant claims to resolve the apparent circularity between the
concepts of freedomand themoral law: “Forwenow see thatwhenwe think
of ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world [Ver-
standeswelt] as members of it and recognize the autonomy of the will along
with its consequence, morality; whereas when we think of ourselves as un-
der obligation, we regard ourselves as belonging to the sensible world and
yet to the intelligible world at the same time” (AK, 4:453; PP, p. 101). Kant
thus treats the gap betweenman’s intelligible and sensible natures as break-
ing the circuit between freedomand themoral law. In giving rise to a certain
inner tension, it is this gap—rather than the concept of intelligible freedom
as such—that leads man to take an interest in a pure moral law and, in fact,
to regard himself as bound by it:
Hence, in spite of regarding myself from one point of view as a being
that belongs to the sensible world, I shall recognize that, as intelli-
gence, I am subject to the law of the intelligible world—that is, to the
reason that contains this law itself in the idea of freedom, and so to the
autonomy of the will; consequently I must look on the laws of the in-
telligible world as imperatives for me, and on the actions conforming
to this principle as duties. [AK, 4:453–54; PP, p. 100]
The key to the possibility of a metaphysics of morals, therefore, lies in
the idea of a world of intelligences and our higher selves as members of it.
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For, in the diﬀerence between this viewpoint and his knowledge of himself
as a passive member of the sensible world, man experiences his “sensed
dependency” on the intelligible world, feeling himself boundby its laws and
thereby taking ametaphysical interest inmorality. This explanationthough,
says Kant,marks the outermost limit of philosophical reﬂectionon thepos-
sibility of a metaphysical moral law. For, while it may thus be shown that
we take an interest in themoral law through the ideaof the intelligibleworld,
we are unable to know how we come to take this interest or just what the
reality of the intelligible world and its freedommight be. On the one hand,
Kant claims that the idea of his membership in the intelligible world is just
one that naturally occurs to man: “This kind of conclusion must be drawn
by a thinkingman from all the things that are presented to him” (AK,4:451–
52; PP, p. 99). On the other hand, through this same unguided reﬂection,
the thinkingman spontaneously becomes aware that hemay have no direct
knowledge of the intelligible world, owing to the passive character of his
sensibility, which conﬁnes human understanding to the domain of empir-
ical appearances. For Kant, man’s self-awareness of his own dual nature
therefore both drives his interest in the metaphysical world of spontane-
ously self-legislating intelligences yet ensures that thisworldwill be the telos
for a moral deportment rather than an object of metaphysical theory. To
view the ﬁgure of homo duplex in this way—as a need of reason rather than
as one of its objects—is to adopt the critical attitude towards it.
In the light of our redescription of the Groundwork, however, it will al-
ready be clear that Kant’s critical reﬂection on the interest in metaphysics
is wholly internal to his metaphysical anthropology and paideia. Not only
does this anthropology conﬁgure the division between man’s intelligible
and sensible natures whose tension is supposed to drive the interest in the
metaphysical world, it also erects the screen of sensibility designed toensure
that this world remains a matter of moral interest rather than theoretical
knowledge. Modern commentary on this set of issues is preoccupied with
showing that Kant’s division between the intelligible and sensible is not
grounded in two ontological worlds—the noumenal and phenomenal—
but in two “standpoints” that humans must take on their actions in “this
world.” In her attempt to free Kant from suspicion of belief in the meta-
physical reality of the intelligible world, Korsgaard thus comments that:
On what I take to be the correct interpretation, the distinction is not
between two kinds of things, but between the beings of this world in-
sofar as they are authentically active and the same beings insofar as
we are passively receptive to them. The “gap” in our knowledge exists
not because of the limits of experience but because of its essential na-
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ture: to experience something is (in part) to be passively receptive to
it, and therefore we cannot have experiences of activity as such. [C,
pp. 203–4]
In failing to grasp the self-transformative function of homo duplex,how-
ever, the “two-standpoints” reading reveals itself to be nothing more than
a particular execution of this function. Learning to view the two worlds as
simply two standpoints—learning, that is, to take a purely practical non-
ontological interest in the intelligible world—is the direct result of coming
to relate to oneself as the bearer of adual—intelligibleandsensible—nature.
For only someone who relates to themselves in this way will make the oth-
erwise extraordinary statement that they can have no direct knowledge of
their role as spontaneous intellectual beings due to the essentially passive
character of their sense-based understanding. In other words, only some-
one who has been trained to believe that they are the bearers of a sponta-
neously active intellect lying outside their human senses will orient
themselves to this level of being by declaring it to be beyond experience.
That Korsgaard’s own “two-standpoints” reading subserves this particular
intellectual deportment is clear from her version of this statement: “As
thinkers and choosers we must regard ourselves as active beings, even
though we cannot experience ourselves as active beings, and so we place
ourselves among the noumena, necessarily, whenever we think and act” (C,
p. 204).
As the epigraphs fromWittgenstein suggest, the signiﬁcance of the state-
ment that we cannot know the noumena lies not in what it says but in what
it does to the one who says it as part of the speciﬁc “work on oneself”whose
instrument it is. By declaring that the world of spontaneous intelligible be-
ings cannot be an object of human experience, Kantians orient themselves
to it, as an object of metaphysical longing andmoral faith. Using themeta-
physical anthropology to position the intelligible world as a reality lying
beyondhumanunderstanding,Kant is able to incite thedesire toparticipate
in this world in the only way available to humans: by treating it as a moral
orientation or standpoint for action in this world. This spiritual exercise is
the basis of Kant’s critical reﬂection that while it is possible to think such
noumenal ideas as that of the intelligible world, thesemust never be treated
as objects of theoretical knowledge, being acceded to instead only for the
moral transformation that they work in us:
In any case, the idea of a pure intelligible world, as a totality of intelli-
gences to which we ourselves belong as rational beings (although on
the other side we are also members of the sensible world), always re-
mains a useful and permitted idea for the purposes of a rational faith
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[vernu¨nftigen Glaubens], even if all knowledge stops at its boundary—
useful and permitted for producing in us a lively interest in the moral
law by means of the noble ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in
themselves (rational beings), to which we can belong as members only
when we carefully conduct ourselves in accordance with the maxims of
freedom as if they were laws of nature. [AK, 4:462–63; PP, p. 108]
Like the university metaphysicians who preceded him, Kant thus uses
the metaphysical anthropology to induce belief in the world of rational be-
ings and its laws. He does so by deploying the gap between man’s higher
rational and lower sensible nature to incite the desire for a pure and puri-
fying metaphysical knowledge of morality, which can only be satisﬁed
through revelation of the categorical imperative. In treating themotivating
idea of membership in the intelligible world as one that just occurs to the
ordinary intelligence, Kant thus folds his account of the foundations of the
metaphysics of morals in on itself, thereby blocking further inquiry into
this idea. Far from indicating metaphysical skepticism, Kant’s critical dec-
laration that the intelligible world lies beyond the reach of theoretical un-
derstanding is thus themeans bywhich he converts thisworld into anobject
of metaphysical faith. In short, Kant treats the idea that induces the interest
in metaphysics as an idea in which human beings are already interested,
transmitted to them via moral feeling from a world lying beyond knowl-
edge—but therefore beyond doubt—hence the object of a metaphysical
faith, admitting of no further explanation or inquiry.
Exit
We have however oﬀered further explanation and inquiry. We have
shown that the three sections of the Groundwork cannot be properly un-
derstood in terms of the metaphysical recovery of a law binding on rational
beings from an ordinary moral consciousness in which it is already con-
tained. Rather, they are better understoodas stages in the spiritualgrooming
of a particular intellectual deportment—one that will regard true morality
in terms of the commands of a pure rational being acceded to through the
purifying discipline ofmetaphysics. Rather than eliciting theneed formoral
philosophy from the “natural dialectic” betweenman’s intellectual andsen-
suous natures, section 1 inculcates the anthropologyofhomoduplex inorder
to incite the desire for metaphysics, presenting this to students as the only
means of purifying their sensuous inclinations and realizing their higher
intellectual natures. So too, rather than showing that the pure idea of a cat-
egorical imperative may only be thought by a “pure practical philosophy”
or metaphysics, section 2 grounds this idea in the spiritual purity and pres-
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tige of the metaphysical sage. This is the exalted personage whose charis-
matic intuition of a moral principle removed from all empirical content
and discursive interpretation takes place through an exemplary exercise in
self-transcendence. Finally, we have seen that section 3 of the Groundwork
does something quite other than show that man’s interest in the meta-
physics of morals arises inevitably from the gap between his intelligible and
sensible natures. Rather, this section seeks to elicit an interest inmetaphysics
from readers whose guided recognition of themselves as divided beings is
designed to incite precisely this interest. As we have seen, not the least in-
teresting aspect of modern Kant commentary is that it is typically carried
out by readers who think of themselves (and everyone else) as divided in
just this way. As a result, they treat metaphysical ethics, not as an interest
cultivated by those committed (by fate or choice) to a certain kind ofmoral
life, but as the morally necessary pursuit of all humans insofar as they fulﬁll
their vocation as rational beings. This quasi-confessional character of the
Kantianmoral culture—its commitment to a single true path tomoral sub-
jecthood—helps to explain its aggressive self-certainty and its inclination
to sectarianism.
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